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Until recently, the need to regulate monopoly was considered virtually
axiomatic, and the imposition of rules governing entry, exit and pricing
was deemed a priority. The deregulation movement has raised pragmatic
questions about these orthodoxies, and, more recently, a new body of eco-
nomic analysis called the theory of contestable markets has provided a
conceptual basis for the view that many markets that are subject to econo-
mies of scale should not be regulated by the conventional methods.1
The new theory has shown that neither large size nor fewness of firms
necessarily means that markets need function unsatisfactorily. Impedi-
ments to entry and exit, not concentration or scale of operations, may be
the primary source of interference with the workings of the invisible hand.
Indeed, because regulators have been predisposed to interfere with both
entry and exit," the new analysis suggests that they have been among the
primary causes of unsatisfactory industry performance.
Contestability theory focuses increased attention upon entry barriers
and redefines their character. Economies of scale, for example, have fre-
quently been considered an impediment to entry; contestability analysis
shows, however, that they need not permit excessive profits or prices or
any of the other manifestations usually associated with market power,
even when scale economies make an industry a natural monopoly or an
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1. The tradition which asserts that even in oligopolistic industries barriers to entry are not always
sufficiently great to permit monopoly profits traces its roots to Chadwick, Results of Different Princi-
ples of Legislation and Administration in Europe: of Competition for the Field as Compared with
Competition Within the Field of Service, 22 J. ROYAL STATISTICAL SOC'Y 381 (1859). A similar
position is taken in Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J. L. & ECON. 55 (1968). These conclu-
sions have recently been extended to the multiproduct case, and derived from a formal theory applica-
ble to the full spectrum of market forms. See W. BAUMOL, J. PANZAR & R. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE
MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982). Much of the material in the first half
of this paper draws on this recent work. For a measured appraisal, see Spence, Contestable Markets
and the Theory of Industry Structure, 21 J. ECON. LITERATURE 981 (1983).
2. There is no shortage of examples. Thus, the ICC has long prevented railroads from aban-
doning unprofitable routes, while before deregulation, the CAB kept many potential entrants out of
the most profitable markets.
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oligopoly. It is the presence of sunk costs rather than economies of scale
that is of vital significance for both theory and practice.
In sum, the theory of contestability calls for a major reorientation of
both the charters and the operating programs of regulatory authorities.
Many of its conclusions are consistent with the philosophy of deregula-
tion. But the new analysis does not adopt the Panglossian view that a
completely unconstrained free market is necessarily the best of all possible
worlds. It claims only that where public measures are called for, the types
of market intervention that ought to be undertaken are, in many cases,
rather different from those that have traditionally been employed, and
that there are some cases in which intervention is inappropriate even
though it was previously thought to be desirable.
In the following pages, we begin by describing the basic principles of
contestability theory. Next, we examine the efficiency attributes of contest-
able markets, the conditions that contribute to the contestability of a mar-
ket, and the general implications for regulatory policy that follow from
this analysis. Finally, we review some of the major regulatory reform ac-
tivities that have been undertaken in Congress, the executive branch, and
the independent regulatory agencies during the past few years and evalu-
ate these moves in terms of contestability. We shall see that, by and large,
the new directions of public policy have been remarkably consistent with
what contestability theory would suggest.
I. Contestability Theory as an Alternative Ideal
A. Perfect Contestability Contrasted With Perfect Competition
The theoretical foundation of both regulatory and antitrust activity has
traditionally relied heavily on the economic concept of perfect competition.
Perfect competition has long been used as a standard ideal for the struc-
ture and performance of a market, though it is widely recognized to be
unattainable in reality. The new analysis proposes the use of a different
ideal: what is termed the "perfectly contestable market." Like perfect
competition, this exemplary market form is undoubtedly unattainable ex-
cept as an approximation. But while perfect competition and perfect con-
testability are both unattainable ideal states, there are many industries
whose structure and performance may usefully be measured against the
latter but not the former. To see why this is so let us first define the two
concepts and indicate the criteria by which they can be taken to constitute
the standard of perfection in industrial structure and performance.
An industry is traditionally deemed to be perfectly competitive if it pos-
sesses all three of the following attributes: (i) It is made up of a very large
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number of firms, each of which provides so negligible a proportion of the
industry's total output that no one firm's output decisions can have any
discernible effect on price; (ii) the industry's products are perfectly homo-
geneous in the sense that no buyer distinguishes between the products of
any two suppliers even in terms of any accompanying services, packaging
or marketing procedures;' (iii) entry into and exit from the industry is
totally unimpeded.
For the purpose of comparison with contestability analysis, the first of
these three attributes is particularly noteworthy. It automatically rules out
from the competitive category any industry in which, for example, scale
economies make small firms relatively inefficient and consequently prevent
their long-run survival in a free market. Because so many industries are
characterized by technology that makes small enterprise completely im-
practical, the norm of perfect competition becomes not only unachievable,
but, for many sectors of the economy, irrelevant. The concept of a per-
fectly contestable market is designed to provide a benchmark that applies
in markets for which the concept of perfect competition is not very useful.
An oligopolistic or even a monpolistic industry can be perfectly contestable
if it is characterized by complete freedom of entry and exit-the last of the
three attributes of perfect competition.
Formally, a market is defined to be perfectly contestable if no price in
that market can be in equilibrium when its magnitude is such as to enable
an entrant to undercut it and nevertheless earn a profit. Thus, a market
that is protected by substantial entry barriers is clearly not contestable,
because the barriers permit an equilibrium involving monopoly prices and
monopoly profits. In the absence of barriers, those prices and profits
would be undermined by entrants seeking to take advantage of the profit
opportunity they provide. Thus, the matter can be looked at in a second
and equivalent way. A market is perfectly contestable if firms can enter it
and then, if they choose, exit without losing any of their investment. If
this condition is satisfied, no prices set by the incumbents that offer profits
to entrants can long endure. Thus, freedom of entry and exit are the key
requirements of contestability.
The second version of the formal definition of a contestable market is
tantamount to a requirement that there be no sunk costs.4 A sunk cost, by
3. The product homogeneity attribute of perfect competition does not play any substantial role in
the discussion that follows. It has been argued that heterogeneity of products can introduce a variety
of inefficiencies. For example, it has been asserted that it tends to lead to a number of (slightly
differing) products which exceeds anything justifiable in terms of costs and consumer benefits (as
measured by the consumers' preferences) and that it leads firms to operate wastefully via unused
capacity. The classic discussion of this subject is found in E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOP-
OLISTIC COMPETITION (1962).
4. Contestability theory draws heavily upon earlier work relating to barriers to entry originating
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definition, is an outlay that cannot be recouped without substantial delay.
If entry into a market requires a new enterprise to sink considerable
amounts of capital, there must be violation of the requirement of perfect
contestability that absolutely costless exit be possible. What is crucial is
not the amount of capital that is required for entry, but the amount of this
capital that is sunk.
Entry involving highly mobile capital, even if it is very substantial in
quantity, may be followed by easy and rapid departure. Even if exit from
the industry as a whole is difficult, mobility of capital may permit easy
and rapid entry into and exit from particular markets in that industry.
Similarly, industries using capital for which a strong second-hand market
exists, or using capital that can readily be leased, are likely to exhibit the
easy entry and exit characteristics needed for contestability. In light of
these considerations, we can define the degree to which an industry is
contestable. For we see that the smaller the share of investment that is
composed of capital that is sunk, the more contestable that industry will
be.'
A contestable market works most effectively if, in response to a profit-
making opportunity, new firms can enter quickly, earn profits at least
temporarily (before incumbents can institute countermeasures) and then
leave without any loss of investment in sunk capital. This suggests that
where incumbents can counterattack quickly, contestability will prevail
only if hit-and-run entry can be carried out even more rapidly. It may
appear that in the race between entry and retaliatory measures by incum-
bents the latter will generally prevail and so will preclude contestability;
incumbents may be able to cut price almost instantly-as soon as entry
with J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956); it also draws from the literature on limiting
pricing growing from the work of P. SYLOS-LABINI, OLIGOPOLY AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS (1962).
Perfectly contestable markets contrast with the circumstances considered in the more usual oligopoly
models in which both incumbent firms and new entrants must sink some costs. For markets in which
sunk capacity is important and leads to strategic behavior when entry threatens or after it occurs,
there is a well-developed literature, ably summarized in Dixit, Recent Developments in Oligopoly
Theory, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 12 (1982).
5. Preliminary empirical evidence confirms that market behavior does indeed follow such a pat-
tern-that is, the smaller the share of sunk outlays, the more closely the behavior of the firms in an
industry follows the pattern to be expected in a contestable market. I. Kesides, Toward a Testable
Model of Entry: A Study of the U.S. Manufacturing Industries (1982) (unpublished manuscript at
Princeton University). Preliminary experimental evidence explores the conjecture that sunk costs
weaken the discipline of contested markets, and finds that the disciplining power of market contest-
ability is impressive. See Coursey, Isaac, Luke & Smith, Market Contestability in the Presence of
Sunk (Entry) Costs, 15 BELL. J. ECON. (forthcoming, 1984). Preliminary experimental evidence also
indicates that prices appear to be near competitive, rather than monopoly, levels when as few as two
identical decreasing cost firms compete for a market large enough for only one of them. See Coursey,
Isaac & Smith, Natural Monopoly and Contested Markets: Some Experimental Results, 27 J. L. &
ECON. (forthcoming, 1984). These discussions suggest that the applicability of the standard of contest-
ability is considerably wider than some of the initial discussions imply. See, e.g., Dixit, supra note 4.
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occurs or, for that matter, as soon as it threatens. But if entry into a
market entails no sunk costs, a potential entrant has no reason to fear
retaliation by incumbents, since it can leave the market without loss if
such retaliation materializes. In many markets, rapid retaliation may not
be possible; regulation, long-term contracts, or other impediments can
slow the response of incumbents to entry. Moreover, a new firm can fore-
stall retaliation by entering into contracts, before it actually opens for bus-
iness, with customers it lures from incumbents.
B. Virtues of Competitive and Contestable Markets
Analysts have been attracted by the concept of perfect competition, de-
spite its lack of realism and its inflexibility, because it has implications
that can readily be used as standards of optimality for industrial perform-
ance. These include the preclusion of excess profits, the elimination of
inefficient firms, the absence of cross subsidy, and pricing consistent with
the allocation of resources available to the economy that is most efficient in
serving the preferences of consumers. For purposes of comparison with
contestability, it is useful to review each of these four attributes and to
indicate why each is a necessary characteristic of a perfectly competitive
industry.
Excessive profits are defined by economists as any long-run profits ex-
ceeding the cost of capital as determined by the markets for debt and
equity. Such excess profits are eliminated in the long run by freedom of
entry in a perfectly competitive industry. If the current cost of capital is
twelve percent and a particular competitive industry offers a return of
eighteen percent, new firms will be attracted into that industry, expanding
outputs and driving down prices to the point where all excess profits have
been squeezed out. The reason that inefficient enterprises cannot persist in
a perfectly competitive industry is similar: cost inefficiencies invite re-
placement of the incumbents by entrants who can provide the same out-
puts at lower cost.
Cross subsidy, a problem that has long been of concern to regulators,6
may be defined, roughly, as the sale by a multiproduct firm of some of its
outputs at prices that are indefensibly low relative to their costs, with the
resulting revenue shortfalls being offset by the charging of indefensibly
high prices for other company outputs. For obvious reasons, cross subsidy
is considered unfair both in its disparate treatment of the firm's customers
and in its effects upon competing sellers of the products that are under-
6. For example, this issue has been the subject of more than a decade of hearings on telecommuni-
cations pricing before the FCC, with AT&T and its large business customers pitted against Western
Union, MCI and other entrants. See, e.g., In re MCI Telecomm. Corp., 70 F.C.C.2d 666 (1979).
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priced (i.e., those products which receive the internal cross subsidy). In
perfectly competitive markets, cross subsidy is ruled out by the inability of
firms to earn any excess profits. If no product of a firm can contribute
more to revenues than its cost of capital, then that enterprise can have no
source of funds with which to provide cross subsidies to any of its other
outputs.
Of the four beneficial consequences of perfect competition, the most dif-
ficult to explain is the relationship between its pricing and efficiency in
the allocation of the economy's resources. As already indicated, under per-
fect competition each firm is so miniscule a part of its industry that its
output decision has no effect on price. The market-determined price there-
fore represents the addition to revenue from the production of another
unit. The most profitable output of a good is, then, that output at which
the marginal cost, the addition to the firm's total cost caused by the pro-
duction of an additional unit, equals the given price.' Thus, perfect com-
petition drives firms to equate marginal costs and prices-and that, ac-
cording to economic analysis, is precisely the price behavior required for
efficiency in the use of resources to serve consumers.8
These are the primary virtues of perfect competition that account for its
widespread use as a criterion for industry performance. To what extent
does perfect contestability share these attributes?' To begin with, perfect
contestability precludes both excess profits and inefficient firm operations
in the long run, for much the same reasons that perfect competition pre-
cludes them. Should either phenomenon arise temporarily, it would make
possible profitable operation by firms charging prices below those of the
7. Thus, if the market price of X is $10, while its marginal cost (including the cost of the addi-
tional capital required) is $9.25, the firm can add to its profit by expanding its output, for it gains
5.75 on each additional unit produced. Gradually, however, diminishing returns will increase margi-
nal cost and erode the profitability of further expansion until a marginal cost equal to the $10 price is
attained, and it pays the firm to set its output there.
8. The reasoning underlying this standard result is fairly straightforward. If a consumer
purchases a unit of good X, the cost his purchase causes, i.e., the value of the resources used up in
meeting this demand, is by definition precisely the marginal cost of X. Thus, if the price of each good
is equal to the marginal cost of that item, the prices consumers pay are the same as the costs caused by
their purchases. Money cost then becomes a perfect proxy for the real social cost incurred in providing
a unit of a good to the consumer. Then, if consumers use their money resources optimally from their
own point of view, i.e., in a way which best serves their preferences, they will automatically be using
the economy's real resources for the satisfaction of consumer desires as efficiently as is possible. In
contrast, if the price of X were low relative to its marginal cost while the reverse were true of good Y,
then consumers would be attracted to buy more of X and less of Y than the true economic costs call
for. For example, suppose X and Y are perfect substitutes for consumers but the marginal cost of X
and Y are 55 and $4, respectively. If, however, the price of X is $5 while that of Y is $5.50 consumers
will spend their money efficiently by purchasing X in preference to Y. But that, clearly, is not com-
patible with efficiency in the use of the economy's resources.
9. For a full examination of the issue with all its technicalities, see W. BAUMOL, J. PANZAR & R.
WILLIG, supra note 1, at 191-345. A more intuitive discussion is provided in Baumol, Contestable
Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 4-5 (1982).
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incumbents. Since entry into a perfectly contestable market is costless, this
opportunity for short-term profits would attract entry-and that in turn
would soon force down prices and profits. Furthermore, with no possi-
bility of excess profits on any of a firm's products, there can be no source
of cross subsidy. Thus the first three virtues of perfect competition are
realized in perfectly contestable industries, and these traditional concerns
of regulators become groundless.
The possibility of economies of scale in perfectly contestable industries
makes the evaluation of the fourth criterion-the equation of price with
marginal cost-more complex. The argument for the case of perfect com-
petition is inapplicable in the presence of economies of scale: efficient sized
firms are large enough to affect price by their output decisions. However,
if scale economies, though significant, do not create a natural monopoly,
perfect contestability ensures marginal cost pricing. Moreover, even in the
case of natural monopoly, perfect contestability ensures that the lowest
price-consistent with the continued provision of the good is charged.
Consider the case in which scale economies do not result in natural
monopoly. Then maximum efficiency is consistent with two or more firms
operating in the industry. A price exceeding marginal cost will create an
opportunity for profitable entry. The entrant can (slightly) undercut the
incumbents' price, and sell slightly more units than some of the incum-
bents. The profit on the additional sales must more than cover the reduc-
tion in profits resulting from the price reduction on the preceding units.
Similarly, if price is below marginal cost, an entrant can offer a slightly
lower price than the incumbents, and sell slightly fewer units. The addi-
tional profits from the reduction in output must more than cover the de-
crease in profits resulting from the decrease in price. Thus prices above or
below marginal costs invite entry, and therefore price will be in equi-
librium only if it equals marginal cost."
In natural monopoly, a single producer can achieve a lower total cost
than can any group of firms and total costs are usually large relative to
marginal costs.11 Only one efficient sized firm can remain. Moreover,
marginal cost pricing is likely to involve costs that exceed revenues, and so
10. A problem can arise if products in a perfectly contestable industry are heterogeneous, each
supplier offering his own special brands with their own special features. However, it can be shown
(through an argument similar to that made above) that if each variant is sold by at least two different
suppliers, perfect contestability will lead to marginal cost pricing. See W. BAUMOL, J. PANZAR & R.
WILLIG, supra note 1, at 314-21, 329-45.
11. It is tempting to compare marginal costs with average costs but in a multiproduct firm (and
virtually all firms in reality are multiproduct enterprises) average costs cannot even be defined, be-
cause of the outlays which are almost always incurred in common on behalf of several of the firm's
products. To give the trivial but standard example, there is no way to determine what part of the
salary of the president of the firm is "caused" by the supply of product A rather than product B, and
therefore constitutes a legitimate portion of A's average cost.
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no such firm can afford such a pricing policy. However, contestability
does ensure that a natural monopolist will be able to prevent entry only if
it sets the lowest prices consistent with the financial viability of the firm.
Otherwise an entrant could slightly undercut his prices, taking the entire
market for himself, and earn a normal profit. Similarly, costless entry pre-
cludes inefficient operation. Moreover, with no above normal profits on
any goods, there is no opportunity for cross subsidy, even by a contestable
monopoly.
This discussion reveals the reason contestability analysis departs from
the tradition which classified scale economies as a barrier to entry. Con-
testability analysis defines an entry barrier as something which provides
incumbent firms sufficient protection from entry so that they can obtain
above normal profits or exhibit other forms of unacceptable performance.
But we have seen that perfect contestability guarantees the absence of ex-
cess profits, inefficiencies and cross subsidies even in the presence of scale
economies. It can also be shown that even in the presence of a natural
monopoly, contestability rewards the firm for selecting the prices that are
most efficient given the requirement of solvency of the enterprise. Thus,
scale economies are not a source of undesirable performance in a contesta-
ble market and cannot be considered a form of entry barrier.
But scale economies do affect the usefulness of contestability relative to
perfect competition as guides for policy. We have seen that to be perfectly
competitive an industry must be populated by a large number of miniscule
firms. But even if each of these dwarf enterprises operates with exemplary
efficiency, the overall result may be inefficient. Suppose, for example, that
the industry's technology provides substantial economies of scale or what
has come to be called economies of scope-i.e., economies that derive from
the simultaneous production of several goods or services. 1 In these cir-
cumstances, large and diversified firms may be able to supply goods far
more cheaply, in terms of resources used, than can the many small firms
of perfect competition.
12. Economies of scope are defined formally as follows: Let C(xy) be the cost of production by a
single firm of quantity x of some good, X, and quantity y of another commodity, Y. Let C(x) be the
cost of producing x if it is done by a completely specialized firm and C(y) have an analogous connota-
tion. Then production of X and Y is characterized by economies of scope if C(x,y) is less than the sum
of C(x) and C(y). That is, economies of scope are present if the multiproduct firm's production of x
and y together incurs a cost lower than the sum of the cost of x alone, when produced by a specialized
firm, and the cost of y when produced by another specialized enterprise. For example, a telecommuni-
cations network can serve many routes more efficiently than it can only a few. If calls from New York
to Los Angeles have just been transmitted via Chicago and the Chicago portion of the route en-
counters a surge of traffic which strains its capacity, the New York-Los Angeles calls can be (and are)
rerouted, say, via New Orleans. Thus, simultaneous provision of service to these four regions makes it
possible to operate with lower capacity in both New Orleans and Chicago. For similar reasons shoe
factories usually produce footwear of different sizes and styles, automotive firms usually produce both
cars and trucks, etc.
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This type of inefficiency is referred to as inefficiency in industry struc-
ture, as distinguished from inefficiency in the operations of individual
firms. We see now that perfect competition, with its requirement that all
firms be small, may be inconsistent with efficiency in industry structure;
when that is the case and markets are free, perfect competition will be
unable to survive. In an industry characterized by perfect contestability,
however, industry structure must be efficient. If an industry is perfectly
contestable and its outputs can be produced more cheaply by four firms
than by three or six or any other particular number of enterprises, then in
the long run that industry must indeed be composed of four firms. A two-
firm or a nine-firm industry structure cannot survive the market pressures
introduced by perfect contestability.
To see why this is so, suppose that by happenstance the hypothetical
industry contains nine enterprises even though four-firm production is
least costly. Some of those nine firms can be depended upon to seize the
cost-reduction opportunity offered by the availability of economies of scale
and scope. These economies will permit the more enterprising firms to
undercut the prices of rivals who are slower to grasp the expansion oppor-
tunity. Costlessness of exit will then make it easy for those laggard rivals
to leave the industry. If no incumbent in the industry is sufficiently enter-
prising to take advantage of the opportunity to undercut prevailing prices,
outsiders sufficiently large to benefit from the economies of scale and scope
will be happy to do so, since in a contestable industry they bear neither
entry cost nor risk. In due course, surplus firms will be driven from the
industry, and a four-firm structure that minimizes the total cost of its
bundle of outputs will emerge. Such a four-firm industry may be perfectly
contestable, but it can hardly qualify as perfectly competitive.
This, then, is the sense in which it can be said that while perfectly
competitive and perfectly contestable markets are both ideals, the latter is
more ideal than the former. After all, one must be tempered in one's
praise of the many-firm structure of perfect competition in those cases in
which the availability of economies of scale and scope means that an oli-
gopoly structure can (perhaps) achieve far lower costs and offer far lower
prices to consumers.
The perfectly competitive structure is simply not attainable in a broad
group of industries. The idea of transforming the automobile, steel, or
telecommunications business into an industry composed of a huge number
of tiny enterprises is absurd on its face. That is why perfect contestability
is a standard of structure and performance that is more pertinent than
pure competition given the character of modern technology.
Yale Journal on Regulation
C. Some Features of Contestable Markets
Several attributes of a contestable industry are particularly significant
for regulatory policy and therefore merit explicit discussion. We will be-
gin by discussing several of the requirements that must be satisfied in
order for a market to be contestable; then we will consider some of the
implications of contestability for market behavior.
Freedom of exit is a crucial ingredient of contestability. In a contestable
market, freedom of exit is merely the obverse of freedom of entry. Any
impediment to exit by definition increases the riskiness, and hence the real
cost, of opening for business. A potential entrant will hesitate long before
embarking on an enterprise from which it will be difficult to withdraw if
his entry proves to have been a mistake. This means that the traditional
resistance of regulators to exit-for example, their refusal to permit the
abandonment of unprofitable routes by railroads or airlines-is hardly
without cost to the economy. However laudable the motivation for opposi-
tion to exit-be it the preservation of service to isolated consumers, the
safeguarding of jobs, or the maintenance of tax bases in financially troub-
led communities-the fact is that it has an unintended adverse conse-
quence: preclusion of, or restraints on, exit discourage entry and thereby
reduce the competitive threat posed by the availability of potential en-
trants. The moral is that when subsidies do serve the public interest, regu-
lators should consider ways to provide those subsidies directly rather than
attempting to encourage cross subsidy by making exit difficult.
This immediately suggests a second necessary feature of contestable
markets: the availability of a pool of potential entrants able to respond
quickly to an entry opportunity and to choose the timing, place, and man-
ner of entry that best suits the circumstances. It is their threat that disci-
plines incumbents and forces them to serve consumers efficiently."3 A reg-
ulatory process in which lengthy hearings and evidence of public
convenience and necessity are prerequisites to entry is precisely what is
not required."' Contestability is also subverted by the regulatory custom
that requires potential entrants to commit themselves well in advance to
the timing and manner of their proposed entry.1 5 Contestability requires
that firms have what can be described as standby authority to enter a
13. The role of potential entry and its threat was first emphasized by Bain, and he, too, main-
tained that it has generally not been given adequate attention. J. BAIN, supra note 4.
14. For example, hearing processes at the CAB tended to take from one to four years to complete,
and even then almost no new authorizations were granted for routes that already had two or more
authorized carriers. Normally, in a route case at most one new carrier was selected for the route. See
Bailey, Deregulation and Regulatory Reform of U.S. Air-Transportation Policy, in REGULATED IN-
DUSTRIES & PUBLIC ENTERPRISE: EUROPEAN & UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVES 29, 29 (1980).
15. For example, CAB rules also required proposed operating schedules to be submitted at the
beginning of a route case.
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market-authority that need not be exercised so long as good performance
by incumbents precludes profit opportunities for entrants, but that can be
used quickly when unsatisfactory incumbent performance offers entrants
the prospect of profit.
In addition to these two crucial elements of contestability, there is a
third feature that facilitates, but is not absolutely necessary to, contest-
ability: sluggishness in the responses of incumbents, particularly the pric-
ing responses, to entry. This does not mean that incumbents should be
prevented from competing fully and effectively by adjusting prices. The
entire purpose of the competitive process from the viewpoint of the gen-
eral welfare is that it forces firms to offer low prices and to provide service
and products of high quality. Contestability theory does suggest, however,
that regulation-induced lags in pricing may well be salutory. While slow-
ness in incumbents' pricing responses to entry is conducive to contestabil-
ity, it is by no means essential. Potential entrants can and do sometimes
make binding contracts with their future customers, and if such contracts
can be agreed upon quickly, the fact that entry takes a longer time be-
comes irrelevant. Once the contract is signed, a retaliatory price reduction
by incumbents will have lost its sting.
We turn now to some pertinent consequences of contestability for regu-
lation. One key characteristic of contestable industries is the dependence of
their structure-including not only number of firms but also the degree of
their integration, the number of different items in their product lines, and
the dispersion in the sizes of enterprises-upon the forces of the market.
This efficiency attribute of long-run equilibrium in a perfectly contestable
market means that any structure compatible with equilibrium must offer
the lowest cost that is attainable. This implies that regulatory attempts to
influence the structure of an industry, perhaps seeking to increase the
number of firms it contains, are often doomed to failure. Newly intro-
duced enterprises either will not survive or will replace some incumbents,
but in the long run the number of firms will be unaffected. In such cir-
cumstances, regulators are all too often tempted to keep firms alive by
subverting competitive pressures-specifically, by establishing what
amounts to a cartel, in which each enterprise is protected from the compe-
tition of the others. But an arrangement of that sort is a monstrosity that
keeps up the appearance of competition by assuring the survival of firms
as an end in itself, by completely undermining the competitive process and
imposing a heavy cost upon the consuming public.
A second implication of contestability for regulation relates to the good
behavior that perfect contestability imposes upon business firms. As we
have seen, the discipline imposed by the possibility of hit-and-run entry
precludes pricing above marginal costs, excess profit, inefficient operation
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or structure, and cross subsidy, even in an oligopoly. If a perfectly contest-
able industry is a natural monopoly, the last three conditions are met and
the firm must charge as low a set of prices as long-run financial viability
permits. Thus, when an industry is contestable, not only is regulatory in-
tervention designed to influence industry structure ineffective, but it is also
unnecessary for the protection of the interests of consumers.
Finally, we observe from what has just been said that in a contestable
industry the absence of entry should not be taken as a sign of predatory
behavior by incumbents, but, on the contrary, as an indication of good
behavior on their part. In a perfectly contestable industry, as we have
seen, entry can be prevented only by performance that satisfies competitive
standards. Thus, if an industry is reasonably contestable a regulator
should certainly hesitate before deciding that a history without entry con-
stitutes grounds for intervention.
One other issue should be noted at this point: Since perfect
contestability is highly improbable in reality, it is necessary to consider the
state of affairs that is likely when the requirements of contestability are
fulfilled only approximately. Unfortunately, since the entire analysis is so
new, the case of imperfect contestability and the attributes of a "workably
contestable" market are only now being explored.
In a recent note, Marius Schwartz and Robert J. Reynolds1 of the
Department of Justice argued that slowness of entry can cause serious
problems for performance even if the lag is only moderate. They assert
that, in such circumstances, rather than acting like perfect competitors and
earning zero economic profits, incumbents will find it rewarding to adopt
prices that yield them monopoly profits during the period before entry
occurs-and then exit gracefully when the entrant opens for business, un-
dercuts the incumbent, and takes the market over. These authors offer
several other scenarios designed to show that slight departures from the
requirements of contestability can cause large deviations from contestable
behavior.
In reply, Baumol, Panzar and Willig"7 undertake to show that
Schwartz and Reynolds do not use the right criterion of proximity to con-
testability. In their view, it is the magnitude of sunk costs, rather than the
entry lag, that is the crucial issue. It is clear that as sunk costs approach
zero the risks associated with entry also become negligible because an en-
trant who finds in retrospect that his entry decision was an error can then
16. Schwartz & Reynolds, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Struc-
jure: Comment, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 488 (1983).
17. Baumol, Panzar & Willig, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry
Structure: Reply, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 491 (1983).
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pick up almost all of his marbles and depart with commensurately little
loss. Thus, if sunk costs are small but not zero, the discipline exercised by
the threat of potential entry remains potent.
The meager empirical evidence also supports this view. But it must be
granted that results on this subject are still highly preliminary and do not
yet lend themselves to confident generalization. Much of what can be con-
cluded about this issue now derives from particularized observations, such
as those in the discussion below of recent regulatory issues. It may be
added, however, that we are as unsure about approximations to perfect
competition as we are about approximations to perfect contestability. The
literature on workable competition is suggestive and illuminating, but it
rests neither on rigorous formal analysis nor on a clear-cut body of
empirical evidence.
II. The Implications of Contestability Theory for Regulatory Policy
We have argued that perfect competition is neither an attainable nor a
desirable benchmark for industries in which economies of scale or scope
are substantial; in such cases, attempts to approximate perfect competition
may in fact be highly inefficient. However, the divergence of such indus-
tries from the patterns of perfect competition does not justify the sorts of
regulation that have traditionally been imposed. Regulators should seek
policies that promote contestability. If an industry behaves as if it is con-
testable, most of the benefits of perfect competition can be obtained with-
out government intervention. In short, our position is that the equilibrium
of a contestable market is often a better standard for public policy than
the competitive model, particularly in the presence of economies of scale
and scope.
Short of doing everything possible to foster contestability, regulators
should certainly cease doing those things that work against it. Direct regu-
latory attempts to impede entry or exit or to interfere with the timing or
manner of entry must, at the very least, be questioned severely. Moreover,
regulators should keep their eyes open for entry barriers erected by firms
and should take steps to discourage the maintenance of those barriers.1
In addition to entry barriers introduced artificially by regulators or in-
cumbent firms, there are in many industries what may be described as
"natural" barriers, i.e., barriers that arise out of technological circum-
stances. For example, the technology of an industry may require heavy
sunk investments on the part of entrants, as we have seen. An investment
18. We will not pursue this subject here because it has been raised and discussed long before the
advent of contestability analysis, and this analysis has, so far, not shed any new light on that part of
our subject.
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that cannot easily be moved elsewhere is an impediment to exit, which, as
has been shown, is in turn a prime obstacle to entry. However, as one
critic has noted to us in conversation, "One cannot regulate away the need
to sink costs." What, then, can be done to weaken the barrier to entry that
is found when entry requires heavy sunk investments?
In these cases, regulators are just beginning to experiment with new
methods to ensure that no excessive profits are earned from sunk-cost fa-
cilities. Rather than relying exclusively on traditional rate and entry regu-
lation, they have turned to two rather novel approaches. The first of these
entails government intervention to ensure equal access to the sunk facility.
If the facility is privately owned, the government requires that all firms
seeking to use the facility be given access to it, that the access price be
reasonable, 9 and that all users be charged the same price. If the sunk
facility is in the hands of a local public authority, then that authority is
encouraged not to discriminate among private users in its access policies.
The second approach is to isolate the sunk investments, leaving a rela-
tively contestable part of the industry's operations to be controlled by mar-
ket forces, while the portion with substantial amounts of sunk capital is
regulated or even operated by the public sector. Thus, some new legisla-
tion and some regulatory decisions are characterized by a flexible case-by-
case approach, in which markets subject to strong competitive pressures
from substitute services and markets in which technology does not require
heavy sunk costs are freed from traditional regulatory constraints and are
permitted more open entry and more flexible pricing. 0 Those segments of
an industry that have large sunk costs or for which there is a problem of
"nonsustainability," that is, absence of an equilibrium,"' must continue to
19. See the discussion of airport access, infra, text accompanying notes 44-45, or the discussion of
access to local telephone systems, infra at Sec. II.D. The lesson that continued regulation to maintain
open access may be appropriate holds even more strongly for industries that are characterized by large
sunk costs and long lead times, such as the electric power industry. For example, it is important to
design and apply criteria for guaranteeing access to transmission systems and power pooling activities.
See P. JOSKOW & R. SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY
DEREGULATION (1983).
20. See the discussion of the Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Decision, infra, text accompanying note 28,
or the discussion of the AT&T settlement, infra, text accompanying note 66. Another example is the
1979 Amendments to the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 96-79, 93 Stat. 589 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), which attempts to distinguish
between, and treat rather differently, in-patient institutional services and noninstitutional and out-
patient services. For in-patient services, continued regulation is called for and the utility of contestabil-
ity analysis is not great because of both sunk cost problems and third-party reimbursement mecha-
nisms. However, contestability analysis is consistent with freeing from entry regulation those portions
of the noninstitutional and out-patient services that are characterized by fixed, but no sunk, costs. See
J. GELMAN, COMPETITION AND HEALTH PLANNING (F.T.C., 1982).
21. In the single product case, no equilibrium is possible if a natural monopoly firm is producing
in a rising portion of its average cost curve. The disequilibrium occurs because any group of customers
who together demand an amount of the product equal to the level at the minimum point on the
average cost curve can supply themselves at a lower price. Thus, they have an incentive to leave the
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be regulated.
We now turn to a description of reform measures undertaken in the
transportation and communications industries during the late 1970's and
early 1980's. We focus in each case upon two or three aspects of reform
that reflect the features of contestability that have been emphasized. Our
descriptions are brief rather than thorough. They outline a framework for
policy which is consistent with contestability theory. The major lesson that
emerges from this analysis is that contestability theory provides no
mechanistic prescriptions or inviolable rules for regulators or for authors
of regulatory reform legislation. However, it does offer substantial insights
that can strengthen the effectiveness of their work.
A. Reform of Railroad Regulation
The sunk cost and longevity of railroad capital may suggest that the
railroad industry is one in which contestability analysis cannot conceivably
apply. However, the railroad industry is more contestable than has been
traditionally acknowledged, because there is strong competitive pressure
from other modes of transportation-such as trucking-on the rates
charged for shipment of a wide variety of commodities. Contestability
analysis tells us that even in markets in which sunk costs are substantial,
pricing power may be held in check by the availability of substitute sup-
pliers whose cost structure is compatible with contestability. In these cir-
cumstances, the theory suggests that rate regulation is not required.
The railroad legislation passed in 1976, the Railroad Revitalization and
Reform Act (4R Act),22 is in harmony with this suggestion. From the
standpoint of contestability, the most pertinent provision of the legislation
is one that offers a railroad freedom in pricing where there is no evidence
that it holds a position of "market dominance."2' 8 The 4R Act provided
that market dominance "refers to an absence of effective competition from
other carriers or modes of transportation, for through traffic or move-
ment."24 The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) has listed four
natural monopoly. The absence of a stable price can occur in the multi-product case as well, and is
particularly likely to occur when there is strong demand substitutability and product-specific scale
economies. In public policy terms, lack of a stable price equilibrium in the face of open entry and exit
may require entry regulation. See Faulhaber, Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprise, 65
AM. ECON. REV. 966 (1973); see also BAUMOL, PANZAR & WILLIG, supra note 1.
22. Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 45, 49, 15 & 31
U.S.C.).
23. The 4R Act prohibited the ICC from deciding that a rate was excessively high without a
finding that the carrier filing the rate had market dominance. Id. § 202(b), 49 U.S.C. § 10,709. In
1980, Congress limited the ICC's jurisdiction to determine that rates are reasonable to those rates
established by rail carriers which the ICC finds have market dominance. Staggers Rail Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-448 § 201(a), 49 U.S.C. § 10,701a (Supp. V 1981).
24. 49 U.S.C. § 10,7 09 (a).
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types of competitive checks that are to be considered in determining
whether there is market dominance over the transport of a particular
product: intramodal competition, intermodal competition, geographic com-
petition (the ability to transport the product to or from a different loca-
tion) and product competition (the availability of substitutes for the pro-
duct). 5 In principle such an approach is entirely consistent with the
implications of contestability analysis. When an industry can be seg-
mented into independent components, it is desirable to free from regula-
tion those parts of the industry in which competing firms lack market
power.
The 4R Act also granted the ICC the authority to exempt the rail car-
riage of certain goods and passengers if the rail carriage was of "limited
scope" and regulation was not otherwise desirable.26 The Staggers Rail
Act of 1980 extended this authority, allowing the ICC to exempt a move-
ment if it finds that rate regulation is not needed to carry out the trans-
portation policy of the Act, and that either the carriage is of "limited
scope" or that regulation "is not needed to protect shippers from the abuse
of market power."' 27 Perhaps the best-known recent example of such an
exemption is the ICC's decision to permit railroads total freedom of pric-
ing in the transportation of fresh fruits and vegetables.2 This action also
accords well with the prescriptions of contestability theory as was recog-
nized by economist Darius Gaskins, who was Chairman of the ICC when
the exemption was passed.
It is noteworthy that the 4R Act did not automatically extend freedom
from regulation to segments of the industry in which a railroad was al-
leged to dominate the market. Consider, for example, coal transport.
Leaps in the price of petroleum, first in the mid-1970's and then again in
1979 and 1980, caused the demand for coal to rise substantially. Railroads
are the chief transporters of coal to major coal-using facilities, such as
electric power plants. Once these plants have been constructed, their relo-
cation is largely precluded. It is clear that Congress was right in continu-
ing regulation of rates when the ICC finds that a carrier has market
dominance.2 9
25. See Market Dominance Determinations & Consid. of Product Competition, 365 I.C.C. 1,118
(1981).
26. 49 U.S.C. § 10,505.
27. Id. § 10,505(a).
28. Rail Gen. Exemption Auth., 361 I.C.C. 211 (1979).
29. See 49 U.S.C. § 10,701a(b)(1). For a more thorough discussion of ICC activity during this
period, see Gaskins & Voytko, Managing the Transition to Deregulation, 44 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 9 (1981); see also A. FRIEDLAENDER & R. SPADY, FREIGHT TRANSPORT REGULATION (1981);
Eads, The Reform of Economic Regulation, in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, TELECOMMUNICA.
TION AND TRANSPORTATION (1982).
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The theory of contestability suggests that in such cases policymakers
should consider ways to encourage potential competition from other
sources. But the case of the railroads illustrates that this must be done
with care and that the most obvious paths may be beset by hidden perils.
For example, if railroad A is required to permit competing railroad B to
lease space on any of A's tracks-that is, to grant B what are known as
trackage rights-the arrangement would appear to enhance competition
by permitting B to bid for shipments along routes that parallel A's but
can reach their ultimate destination only by traversing some of A's track.
This is indeed so if the price for trackage rights is settled voluntarily in a
free competitive market. However, if regulators force the provision of
trackage rights at a noncompensatory price, this action will amount to a
subsidy to railroad B that effectively drives A from the field and under-
mines competition and efficiency rather than enhancing them.
Similarly, some proponents of enhanced competition have proposed that
the right of eminent domain be granted to coal slurry pipelines in order to
force railroads to permit the pipelines to cross rail property."0 It is as-
serted that this will increase greatly the competitiveness of coal transpor-
tation. But here, too, there is a pricing complication. Environmental
groups claim that the pipelines will make heavy use of scarce water sup-
plies and that disposal of waste products from the pipelines will exact a
heavy pollution cost. The pipelines should be forced to bear the full costs
of water use and waste disposal through direct charges or other measures.
Otherwise, heavily subsidized entities will be pitted against firms that are
required to cover their own costs, resulting in inefficiency and environ-
mental degradation rather than real competition.
Whatever the true facts in these matters, the moral is clear. The en-
forced introduction of competition must not be accompanied by artificial
prices for incumbents or entrants; otherwise, more harm than benefit may
flow from it, and no contribution to contestability will result.
B. Aviation Deregulation
The Airline Deregulation Act of 197831 rested upon such a degree of
confidence in the inherent structural competitiveness of the domestic U.S.
airline industry that it went further in deregulating than any other piece
of recent legislation. Regulatory barriers to entry of the type that had
30. See, e.g., Tarlock, Western Water Law and Coal Development, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 511,
538 (1980). One pipeline company has won right of way disputes with railroads in the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits. Energy Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. 619 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1980); Energy
Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R., 606 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1979).
31. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
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been favored by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) were removed within
three years of its passage. 2 Under the Act, the CAB can no longer block
new jet carriers from entering the industry, nor can it conduct lengthy
route cases to decide which additional carrier will be permitted to serve a
particular pair of cities."3 The new legislation recognizes the benefits of
permitting potential competitors to respond to profit opportunities by en-
tering markets freely. Even though the number of actual competitors in
most markets might not change very much as a consequence, the Act gave
airline managements complete freedom in the structuring of their route
networks,' relying on this freedom as an adequate check on market
power. The Act also provided for complete freedom of pricing, effective
one year after entry became unimpeded.3 5 The only exception to the
deregulatory tone was for air services involving small communities: to
avoid curtailment of these services, the Act provided direct subsidies for a
ten-year period."'
In some ways the airline industry presents a particularly close approxi-
mation to contestability. As discussed above, the more mobile the capital
and the smaller the sunk costs involved in an industry, the more that in-
dustry approaches perfect contestability. The major component of capital
equipment in the airline industry, the airplanes themselves, can readily be
moved from market to market. Such items of equipment are, in Alfred
Kahn's words, "marginal costs with wings." This is true even though,
because of technological economies of scale with respect to aircraft size,
the majority of U.S. city-pair markets are natural monopolies (and so are
likely to be served by only one carrier even under free entry) and all
markets are likely to show high concentration."
The evidence on route networks since deregulation corresponds well to
the theory. Because of the economies of aircraft size, the cost of accommo-
dating a passenger in an otherwise empty seat is quite small. Airlines thus
have a strong incentive to establish hub-and-spoke operations. Flights
from various origins arrive at an intermediate point where passengers
change planes to proceed to their ultimate destinations. By combining pas-
sengers with different origins and destinations, a carrier can increase the
32. 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a).
33. Id. § 1371(d)(7)(A).
34. Id. § 1302(a)(4).
35. Id. § 1551(a)(2)(B).
36. Id. § 1389. For a description of the events leading up to the Airline Deregulation Act and a
more complete analysis of its features, see S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 197-221 (1981).
37. As described in D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN, COMPETITION AND THE AIRLINES: AN EVALUA-
TION OF DEREGULATION 54 (1982) (CAB Staff Report), the average number of large aircraft opera-
tors providing nonstop service was less than four carriers even in the densest markets (those having
more than 500 passengers per day).
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average number of passengers per flight and thereby reduce costs. Essen-
tially, the broader scope of operations lets the carrier take advantage of
the economies of scale in aircraft size. Because of these advantages of hub-
and-spoke operation, both the trunk and local service carriers 8 have in-
creased their use of hubbing in the deregulation period when entry has
been free. For example, in 1978, only three of the sixteen regulated air-
lines had twenty percent or more of their total domestic departures out of
their leading city; by 1981, the number had increased to ten airlines. On
the other hand, open entry has not led to extreme proliferation of carriers
on routes. The average number of carriers per route has increased, but the
increase has been moderate. For instance, in the post-deregulation period,
approximately two carriers per route serve in the moderate-density, short-
haul markets, whereas three to four carriers per route serve in the densest
markets.
The condition of contestability theory that incumbents' prices must be
relatively "sticky" is not met in aviation. In many cases, incumbent air-
lines respond immediately to meet a new competitor's lower fares. So it
may not be surprising that the evidence on pricing policy since deregula-
tion is more complex. In theory, after a transition period, potential rather
than actual competition should serve to police markets. In particular, if all
airlines face the same market demands and have access to the same pro-
ductive techniques as those available to incumbent firms, actual entry
should not be needed to limit prices, and price wars and related strategic
behavior by incumbents should not be observed. We know that during the
first year or two after deregulation, trunk carriers were held to lower
price ceilings than local service carriers. Bailey and Panzar3 ' showed that
despite the presence of economies of density in city-pair airline markets,
potential competition by trunk carriers was effectively policing the pricing
behavior of local service carriers in their long and medium-haul routes.
However, in trunk markets during that period, and in virtually all mar-
kets since then, actual (as distinguished from potential) competition has
been found to play a significant role.
Graham, Kaplan and Sibley have concluded that the presence of newly
38. Sixteen trunk carriers were certificated in 1938; this number had shrunk through mergers to
ten carriers by the time of passage of the Airline Deregulation Act. Trunk carriers are large jet
aircraft operators serving dense city-pair markets. In contrast, local service carriers are specialty carri-
ers, certificated by the Board in the mid-1950's to provide subsidized feeder service to small communi-
ties in nonoverlapping regions. By 1978, these carriers, too, were largely jet operators, but typically
used smaller, two-engine jets rather than the three-engine and four-engine jets typical of the trunk
carriers. For a history, see E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM, & D. KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIRLINES
(forthcoming, 1984).
39. Bailey & Panzar, The Contestability of Airline Markets During the Transition to Deregula-
tion, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 134-44 (1981).
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certificated carriers has a substantial effect on fares in the markets they
serve.'0 They also found that fares are higher in markets served by the
four airports 1 in which there is a shortage of landing slots and higher
also in markets in which concentration is quite pronounced. Price wars
have broken out on the denser routes normally flown by three-engine and
four-engine jets. Moreover, incumbent carriers appear to be calculating
whether or not they would be better off if they fail to match the lower
fares of new entrants and learn to coexist with them rather than matching
these fares in order to try to drive out the less-established enterprises.
This is, of course, a behavior pattern one would expect from rival oligo-
polists in the standard analysis, not from players in a perfectly contestable
world.
This evidence suggests that the contestability benchmark does not fully
hold sway in the first years after deregulation. Why is the industry char-
acterized by fierce rivalry rather than by quiet long-run equilibrium? The
pure theory of contestable markets is an analysis of equilibrium condi-
tions, just as the pure theory of perfect competition is. In the current real-
ity in aviation, many of the assumptions underlying stationary equilib-
rium theory simply are not holding true. For example, the route network
was closed to free entry for forty years. It is not reasonable to expect an
instant adjustment to a deregulated equilibrium. Instead, market shares of
major groups of carriers have been shifting rapidly, with the large trunk
carriers losing market share to local service carriers and new entrants."
The doubling of fuel prices between 1978 and 1981 has had a profound
effect on optimal aircraft deployment, and has meant that two-engine jets
have become relatively more efficient than three-engine and four-engine
jets. There is thus substantial excess capacity in three-engine and four-
engine jets, and undercapacity in two-engine jets. Economic theory sug-
gests that undercapacity will lead to higher prices until more planes can
be brought on line. The expected response to overcapacity is price wars.
When the excess capacity is substantial, prices will be near variable costs
rather than full marginal costs (including the cost of capital). This signals
to the investment community that additional capital is not required in the
area.
Another standard assumption of equilibrium theory is that all players
in the market have the same cost structures. This is not currently true in
aviation. Costly labor contracts and associated restrictive work rules nego-
40. D. GRAHAM, D. KAPLAN & D. SIBLEY, EFFICIENCY AND COMPETITION IN THE AIRLINE IN-
DUSTRY (1982) (CAB Staff Report).
41. The four are Washington's National Airport, Chicago's O'Hare Airport, and New York's
Kennedy and LaGuardia Airports.
42. See E. BAILEY, D. GRAHAM & D. KAPLAN, supra note 38.
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tiated during forty years of regulation bind the older trunk carriers; most
of the new entrants, however, are not unionized. Thus, new entrants have
a cost advantage and can earn profits at prices that are not compensatory
to incumbent carriers. A third, and apparently very important, influence
impeding contestability is the PATCO job action, which restricted entry
into-and has provided an incentive to avoid exit from-major airports.
Slots have generally been treated as a vested and non-tradable right of
incumbent carriers, with entry by competing carriers largely precluded
because of the freeze in capacity.4"
The factors just discussed have impeded contestability. Given the inher-
ent ability of airlines to move in and out of markets relatively uncon-
strained by sunk costs, these markets should exhibit more of the character
of contestability before a great deal of time has passed. But it is unlikely
that perfect contestability will be achieved over the short run since
changes in labor contracts and fleet configuration cannot be carried out
quickly.
Before leaving this analysis of the aviation industry, two additional im-
plications of contestability analysis should be noted. First, even in avia-
tion, sunk costs are present-particularly at airports. Theoretically, if a
particular airline were permitted to own an airport, then it could obtain
the monopoly rents associated with that airport, through the prices
charged to its passengers or to the other carriers permitted to use the facil-
ities at that airport. Thus, the prevention of control and ownership of
airports by particular airlines is important for the contestability of mar-
kets in the industry. In general, rules of access to airports should be given
careful consideration by policymakers. Accordingly, it is a matter for con-
cern when local airport authorities attempt to deal with slot or noise con-
straints by banning new entry while permitting incumbent carriers to ex-
pand at will."" Another matter for concern is the appropriateness of long-
term lease arrangements that allocate airport space to particular carriers
and that give these carriers the power to determine when, to whom, and
at what price to sublease space to their competitors. ' A similar concern
over newcomers' access has arisen with respect to computer reservations.
In some regions of the country, travel agents predominantly use a single
43. See Grether, Isaac & Plott, The Allocation of Landing Rights by Unanimity Among Compet-
itors, 71 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 166, 167 (1981).
44. For example, San Diego sought in 1979 to exclude new airlines but did not plan to restrict
new access by existing incumbents. After the FAA and CAB intervened the airport authorities with-
drew their proposal. Orange County's John Wayne Airport had a similar plan which is currently
under challenge in federal court. Pacific Southwest Airlines v. County of Orange, No. 81-3248 (C.D.
Cal. 1983).
45. See AIRPORT ACCESS TASK FORCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1983) (made pursuant
to 49 U.S.C. § 2223) (1982).
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system which is typically supplied by one large carrier. It has been
charged that if a carrier denies access to a competitor, uses market infor-
mation obtained from the reservation system to pressure travel agents to
ticket on its own airline, or adopts other anticompetitive practices, the
beneficial effects of entry deregulation can be stymied, at least in the short
run.
4 6
Second, contestability theory has important implications for merger pol-
icy. Any merger involving overlapping routes would never have been ap-
proved under the 1968 Justice Department guidelines, since, as we have
mentioned, four-firm concentration ratios for virtually all city-pair routes
are near one hundred percent.47 Nevertheless, ease of entry and exit ought
to be a uniform characteristic of airline markets. Thus, the assessment of
mergers for such markets should rely on a functional analysis of the de-
gree of contestability of markets rather than on market share and concen-
tration ratio data. As long as there are comparable airlines with stations
at one or both ends of the overlapping markets, the CAB does not consider
a competitive problem to be present. Bailey48 cites the case of the Hous-
ton-New Orleans market in the Texas International and National merger
case. In spite of the two-firm concentration ratio of seventy-five percent
after the proposed merger, the presence of eleven carriers with facilities
already functioning at both ends of this market led to approval of the
merger. Contestability theory indicates that it is precisely that sort of case-
by-case analysis, taking into account ease of entry and exit as well as scale
effects within markets, that should be used by policy-makers to evaluate
the appropriateness of mergers. Indeed, it appears that the Justice De-
partment has moved in this direction.4
46. In December 1982, the Conference Committee on the 1983 appropriations for the Depart-
ment of Transportation was sufficiently concerned about this issue that it ordered a joint CAB and
Department of Justice investigation into computer reservation system practices. See 128 CONG. REC.
H9510, H9515 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1982) (conference report on H.R. 7019); CIVIL AERONAUTICS
BOARD, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON AIRLINE COMPUTER RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS (1983).
47. See Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 14510, at 6884
(May 30, 1968). However, the 1982 Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493, explicitly consider
potential entry both in identifying the firms to be included in the relevant market, 47 Fed. Reg.
28,495, and in assessing the ability of existing firms to raise price, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,498. Consideration
of the prospects for entry into airline markets might well lead the Justice Department not to challenge
an airline merger. This, of course, is entirely consistent with the implications of contestability
analysis.
48. Bailey, Contestability and the Design of Regulatory and Antitrust Policy, 71 AM. ECON. REV.
178, 181 (1981). For a fuller description, see CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, ANTITRUST POLICY FOR
THE AVIATION INDUSTRY (1982).
49. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 47, at 28,495-98.
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C. Trucking Regulation and its Partial Reform
Theory suggests that, with the possible exception of barge transporta-
tion, trucking should be perhaps the most contestable of the economy's
industries; but it has long been subjected to regulatory entry control. The
largest class of ICC-regulated carriers-general freight carriers-
specialize in less-than-truckload services, making multiple deliveries and
pick-ups along regular routes. Regulatory control has taken the form of
certificates describing the commodities permitted to be hauled and the spe-
cific cities along which each such commodity may be carried. These inter-
ventions have undercut the ability of carriers to serve routes at minimum
cost since the restrictions have made it difficult to utilize capacity fully,
especially on backhauls. Breyer cites studies indicating that regulated gen-
eral-freight vans return empty more than one-third of the time, and that a
reduction in their regulation could increase load factors by ten percent."
Studies also indicate that ICC restrictions on the ability of "exempt" car-
riers (such as private carriage by firms of their own goods, carriage of
goods within states and carriage of agricultural commodities) to haul
goods for movements subject to regulation has resulted in an excessive
amount of empty backhauling. 1
The Motor Carrier Act of 19802 liberalized entry into the less-than-
truckload portion of trucking and exempted additional types of motor car-
rier transportation from economic regulation."' From the perspective of
contestability, these route liberalizations offer an important opportunity
for enhanced efficiency. In a recent study that attempts to distinguish be-
tween economies of scale and economies of scope in the trucking industry,
Chiang offers important new evidence about how greater freedom of entry
may contribute to market efficiency." She found that there are strong
economies of joint production in distribution networks associated with
short-haul and intermediate-haul trucking shipments, particularly for
small and medium-sized firms. Mergers in trucking are undertaken by
firms seeking to obtain the full range of benefits afforded by these econo-
mies of scope. These findings illustrate an important feature of contestable
markets: if left alone, contestable markets will tend to move toward the
50. See S. BREYER, supra note 36, at 225 nn. 47-48.
51. See P. MACAVOY & J. SNOW, REGULATION OF ENTRY AND PRICING IN TRUCK TRANSPORTA-
TION 24-27 (1977).
52. Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
53. Additional exemptions are set forth in 49 U.S.C. § 10,526(a). Entry restrictions are eased by
id. §§ 10,922, 10,762, & 11,145.
54. W. Chiang, Economies of Scale and Scope in Multiproduct Industries: A Case Study of the
Regulated U.S. Trucking Industry (1981) (Ph.D. Dissertation, Dep't of Civil Engineering, MIT).
For a discussion of other cost studies of multiproduct industries, see Bailey & Friedlaender, Market
Structure and Multiproduct Industries, 20 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1024 (1982).
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most efficient organization of productive forces.
Chiang's study shows also that there is no evidence of global economies
of scale in trucking, which suggests that such firms will not attain mo-
nopoly size in an unregulated environment. Thus, regulatory inhibition of
entry in trucking has been perverse in at least two respects: it has pro-
moted inefficiency in market structure, and it has been unnecessary for the
control of monopoly. Moreover, there is no evidence that barriers to entry
would have emerged in trucking had regulatory intervention not occurred.
Most of the truckiig industry's costs are variable, consisting of trucks and
drivers. The consolidation of shipments by networking or centralizing re-
pair or administration can produce economies of scale, but these are un-
likely to confer monopoly power; firms benefitting from these economies
cannot raise prices much above their costs without losing business to en-
terprises on nearby routes that could readily extend their operations.
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 introduced zones of price flexibility for
general commodity carriage, thereby somewhat increasing the opportunity
for competition."5 Available evidence suggests that decontrol would lead to
lower prices. For example, when poultry and frozen foods and vegetables
were reclassified in the 1950's to fall under an agricultural exemption,
rates declined over a five-year period by thirty-three percent for poultry
and nineteen percent for frozen foods. 6 Breyer cites studies that show that
rates are lower in intrastate than in interstate markets,57 and that rate
reductions followed the relaxation of regulations in countries such as West
Germany and Australia.5"
D. Telecommunications Regulation and the Antitrust Case
Although Congress has now considered legislative reform of telecommu-
nications regulation for several years, the most dramatic regulatory
changes have actually emerged from the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC), tie Department of Justice and the federal courts. The
decisions can be characterized as attempts to isolate the segment of the
telecommunications market still considered to involve technological natural
monopoly, i.e., local telephone service, from segments that can, perhaps,
no longer be taken to constitute natural monopolies, such as long distance
services and the provision of terminal equipment. The situation has been
55. 49 U.S.C. § 10,708.
56. J. SNITZLER & R. BYRNE, INTERSTATE TRUCKING OF FRESH AND FROZEN POULTRY UNDER
THE AGRICULTURAL EXEMPTION (1958) (Dep't of Agric. Mktg. Research Div., MRR-244); J. SNIT.
ZLER & R. BYRNE, INTERSTATE TRUCKING OF FROZEN FRUITS AND VEGETABLES UNDER THE AGRI.
CULTURAL EXEMPTION (1959) (Dep't of Agric. Mktg. Research Div., MRR-316).
57. See S. BREYER, supra note 36, at 229 n.52.
58. Id. at 229 nn.54-55.
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complicated primarily by the large costs common to local and long dis-
tance services and by the possible economies and externality benefits asso-
ciated with joint operation of these services within a single firm.
FCC and court decisions that permit subscribers to buy terminal equip-
ment from firms other than AT&T's subsidiary, Western Electric, and to
attach the equipment to AT&T's lines raise few problems in terms of
contestability analysis. 9 So long as production of this equipment is not a
natural monopoly and the equipment manufactured by firms other than
Western Electric does not produce noise or other forms of "harm" for the
telephone network, contestability analysis suggests that regulatory policy
should encourage access to local telephone systems on equal terms because
of the large sunk costs associated with the provision of local service. Free-
dom of entry is preferred, according to the theory, over arrangements that
bar local phone companies or other firms from selling telephone
equipment.
The issues involving local versus long distance services are more com-
plex, in part because of the common cost problem and in part because of
the efficiencies derived from coordinated operation of an integrated net-
work. For example, such an efficiency arises because AT&T commonly
routes calls during busy periods through distant switching centers if
nearer ones are operating at full capacity.6" This is only one of a variety
of network-wide planning decisions that may make production less costly
when local and long distance operations are contained within one firm.6
On the other hand, the natural monopoly characteristics of long dis-
tance services and the large sunk costs associated with those services are
being modified by technological change. Cable technology has at least to
some extent been replaced in long distance markets by wireless microwave
transmissions systems and, more recently, by satellites. These new tech-
niques have opened new policy options, since, for example, it may be pos-
sible for several different firms to use microwave or satellite technology to
transmit calls on many routes without significantly increasing unit costs.
In a series of decisions beginning in 1959 with Above 890, the FCC has
given a number of firms the right to use microwave transmissions for pri-
vate line services, i.e., services not involving any connection with the Bell
local exchange network. 2 The D.C. Circuit, in the 1977-78 Execunet
59. Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Carterphone Device,
13 F.C.C.2d 420, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968); Interstate Foreign Message Toll Tel. Serv. (Registration
Program), 56 F.C.C.2d 593 (1975), 58 F.C.C.2d 736 (1976).
60. BELL TELEPHONE LABORATORIES, INC., ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS IN THE BELL SYSTEM
31, 87-92 (1977).
61. See Southern Pac. Com. Co. v. AT&T Co., 556 F. Supp. 825, 868-70 (D.D.C. 1983).
62. Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc., 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959), modified, 29
F.C.C. 825 (1960). See, e.g., Microwave Com., Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1967), reconsid denied, 21
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rulings, overturned FCC decisions and extended freedom of entry beyond
the provision of private line services, permitting entry in direct competi-
tion with Bell long distance service."' The Domestic Satellites decision
permitted firms other than AT&T to use satellites to provide specialized
communications services."' Similarly, emerging technological developments
such as cellular mobile radio are threatening to erode the natural monop-
oly attribute of local service. 65
The consent decree involving the Justice Department and AT&T"6 is
far more wide-ranging than anything done by the FCC, as it imposed a
major change in market structure. It required a complete separation of
local and long distance services. Local service is now offered by a series of
regulated monopolies, consisting of groupings of former Bell System oper-
ating companies. Long distance service is provided in a much more com-
petitive environment. The Bell System is also permitted to enter unregu-
lated markets, such as the computer market, in which the technology is
becoming less and less distinguishable from that in communications.
Contestability analysis can provide some framework for discussion of
the issues surrounding local and long distance service, but it does not nec-
essarily offer definitive answers. To the extent that the consent decree has
succeeded in separating markets characterized by sunk costs and natural
monopoly from markets that are reasonably contestable, the decree would
seem consistent with contestability analysis. Similarly, contestability anal-
ysis favors the realization of economies of scope between telecommunica-
tion and computer services which the decree permits. However, to the ex-
tent the decree prevents the realization of economies of scope between
local and long distance services or results in substantial quality differences
across regions with attendant degradation in all service or prevents compe-
tition when new technologies, such as cellular mobile radio, reduce sunk
costs requirements, questions are raised by the analysis. These uncertain-
ties reflect the critical importance of technological considerations in the
application of contestability theory.
F.C.C.2d 190 (1970), modifs granted, 27 F.C.C.2d 380 (1971); Specialized Common Carrier Servs.,
29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971), afrd sub nom. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d
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Communications, Inc., 29 F.C.C.2d 62 (1971); Cellular Communications Sys., 50 RAD. REG. 21 (P
& F) 1673, 51 RAD. REG. 2D (P & F) 143 (1982).
66. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), appeal dismissed, United
States v. Western Elec. Co., 714 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Vol. 1: 111, 1984
Contestable Markets
Conclusion
The new contestability theory clearly makes no pretense of solving all
problems, but it does seek to identify the proper questions-how to iden-
tify circumstances in which deregulation should occur and, where continu-
ing regulation is appropriate, what forms it should take. By focusing at-
tention on sunk costs as a major reason for regulatory intervention, and by
specifying a variety of tools and methods to minimize the market power
associated with them, the contestability perspective offers some degree of
direction to policymakers. Policy analysts should begin by determining
what regulatory or other obstacles stand in the way of contestability and
then should consider ways to reduce or eliminate them.
Contestability theory also offers a coherent analysis of market structure
issues, and underscores how important investigation of actual conduct and
performance is in the presence of concentration attributable to scale econo-
mies. Because there may well be sunk costs and entry barriers at an in-
dustry level, a market-by-market analysis within the industry may have to
be undertaken. The new theory supports policy measures that attempt to
separate out those portions of an industry in which market failures attrib-
utable to natural monopoly or other elements play an important role from
those portions of the industry in which fixed, but not sunk, costs
predominate, so that competition and consumer choice can contribute to
quality and restrain costs. If particular markets are readily contested,
there may be no need for continued intervention in these markets. Simi-
larly, the theory suggests that even in industries where deregulation may
be called for in some areas, continued regulation to maintain open access
may be appropriate. In this and other ways the new theory sheds light on
the appropriateness of traditional patterns of regulation and the avenues
available for deregulation.
Our discussion of particular regulated industries confirms once again
that reality is more complex than any theoretical model, so that the latter
can never be expected to provide standardized procedures that produce
cut-and-dried solutions to the problems encountered in practice. We may
seek to determine appropriate boundaries between regulated and unregu-
lated portions of an industry, but boundaries based on technological con-
siderations alone may prove misplaced. An analysis such as that provided
by contestability theory, while not free of difficulties, can reasonably as-
pire to offer the practitioner greater confidence and clearer insight into the
pertinent issues.

